Summary of the article - Introducing Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers by Anthony F. Beavers

One of the important questions that philosophy addressed down the centuries is about the moral ‘ought’ which asks the question why one needs to be good. Emmanuel Levinas found the answer in the level of the individual i.e. in the level of person to person contact. For him the question of moral ‘ought’ becomes before reason and it is necessary to have at least two people when we talk about ethics. He establishes the source of contact in the interpersonal realm as the ethical.

Although it may sound superfluous it has a deep meaning in philosophy as it responds to the rationalistic tradition of philosophy especially of Descartes. The latter thinks of the other as the object of the creation of the mind and denies the existence of the extra-mental reality. Levinas calls this act as the violence of ‘totalization’. It reduces the individuality, difference and autonomy of the Other. This act is unethical for Levinas.

The above mentioned violence is due to the exclusive importance to the rationality while edging sensibility out. Sensibility is a lived experience rather than being understood with concepts. Moreover, it is enjoyed by the subject after being nourished by the objects of sensibility (e.g. bread to eat). This also shows the distinction between the subject and the object of enjoyment. Consequently, in enjoyment, the, self comes up as the subject of its need. Thus Levinas appreciates the subjectivity on the level of sensibility than rationality. In addition, the subject can find the Other easily and more clearly through sensibility than in the realm of consciousness. Here the subject finds that the Other cannot be made part of the subject like any other things as the Other resists consumption.

Levinas acknowledges the power of transcendence of the Other beyond the categories of the thought of the subject. It is accepted by the epiphany of Face that talks to the subject, “I am not yours to be enjoyed: I am absolutely Other.” This is a surprise to the subject since the arrival of the Face depicts the vulnerability of the subject. The solitude of the subject is invaded by the Other.  The surprise makes the subject being caught off guard. It indicates more about the presence of the Other than the perception of the Other. The presence of the Other is beyond the control of the subject as it is demanded of the subject.

There are two important steps involved in this act namely proximity and substitution. Proximity is the immediate contact of the Other with the subject. It is a responsibility laid upon the subject with the new characteristic given to the subject. The new subjectivity shows that social subject is to be for-the-Other. Thus subjectivity is subjection to the Other i.e. the subject is subjected to the Other who intrudes its solitude and interrupts the egoistic enjoyment. It is a command given to the subject to live ethically with the Other. In other words, it makes the subject to stand in the place of the Other.

The standing in the place of the Other leads to the second step of substitution.  It is the state, according to Levinas, where the subject is held hostage by the Other. Substitution is the sign of being an Other-directed human person. This also makes clear that the subject belongs to itself and subject is not ‘another’ but itself (I am not another but me).

Substitution is to acknowledge oneself in the place of the Other not with the conceptual recognition but in the sense of finding oneself in the Other as a hostage for the Other. This process gives more meaning that the above mentioned subjection by the Other becomes subjection for the Other as St. Paul says, “I have become all things to all people that I might by all means save some” (I Corinthians 9:22).  The mere desire to respond is already  responsiveness to the command of the Other.

Although the approach toward the Other as Levinas proposed gives more meaning for interpersonal relationship it was not well appreciated by some ethicists. A person responds to the Other because the person feels a personal need to do so in order to satisfy his/her need and this action has no true moral worth.

Levinas answers that the Other has a transcendence and the subject is already substituted for the Other. The subject is made to stand for the other, before freedom and reason in ethics. Consequently, there is an ethical responsibility with the Face-to-Face relationship. Thus responsibility is essential, primary and fundamental mode of subjectivity in ethical terms and precedes ontological and existential base. The mere node of subjective is knotted in ethics is the responsibility towards the Other. Responsibility is the link between the subject and the Other. This moral ‘ought’ is the acceptance of Other person as person which Levinas wants to emphasize in the history of philosophy. There is no true sociality away from ethics and vice versa. Furthermore, the meaning of Otherness is found in the responsibility given to me and not in the interpretation given by the subject.  Finally, any relation of the subject with the Other person gives the responsibility to the former. This is the source of the moral ‘ought’ in the philosophy of Levinas.